U.S. Army Physical Security And Force Protection For Personnel, Weapons and Property
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Full text of "FM Physical Security"
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Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations Full view - These types of threat descriptions called the design-basis threat can be used to design detailed protective systems to mitigate the attacks. TM and DA Pam contain procedures for establishing design-basis threat descriptions in the format described above. These procedures can be used together or separately. Threats listed in theTM will be summarized later in this chapter.
The likelihood rating is used to determine the weapons, tools, and explosives that will be used by a particular aggressor in carrying out a specific tactic. In this procedure, higher likelihood ratings result in more severe mixes of weapons, tools, and explosives. The assumption is that the more likely the attack, the more resources the aggressor is likely to use in carrying out the attack.
The level of protection applies to the design of a protective system against a specified threat for example, a bomb, breaking and entering, pilfering, and so forth. The level of protection is based on the asset's value rating from either DA Pam or TM The level increases as the asset's value rating increases. There are separate levels of protection for each tactic. TM provides detailed guidance on how to achieve the levels of protection, and Chapter 3 of this manual provides a summary of the levels of protection as they apply to various tactics.
Vulnerabilities are gaps in the assets' protection. They are identified by considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are associated with those tactics. Some vulnerabilities can be identified by considering the general design strategies for each tactic described in TM and as summarized in Chapter 3 of this manual.
The general design strategies identify the basic approach to protecting assets against specific tactics. For example, the general design strategy for forced entry is to provide a way to detect attempted intrusion and to provide barriers to delay the aggressors until a response force arrives. Vulnerabilities may involve inadequacies in intrusion-detection systems IDSs and barriers.
Similarly, the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as far from the facility as possible and to harden the facility to resist the explosive at that distance. Where vulnerabilities have been identified, protective measures must be identified to mitigate them.
The key to effective development of protective systems is a partnership between physical- security personnel and the installation engineers. Appendix E of this manual discusses information for office security, which should be listed in the physical-security plan see Appendix F. Appendix G discusses personal- protection measures. Protective systems integrate physical protective measures and security procedures to protect assets against a design-basis threat.
The characteristics of integrated systems include deterrence, detection, defense, and defeat. A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be deterred from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with the aggressor's sophistication, the asset's attractiveness, and the aggressor's objective. Although deterrence is not considered a direct design objective, it may be a result of the design.
A detection measure senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of the detection, and communicates the appropriate information to a response force. A detection system must provide all three of these capabilities to be effective. Detection measures may detect an aggressor's movement via an IDS, or they may detect weapons and tools via X-ray machines or metal and explosive detectors.
Detection measures may also include access-control elements that assess the validity of identification ID credentials. These control elements may provide a programmed response admission or denial , or they may relay information toa response force. Guards serve as detection elements, detecting intrusions and controlling access. Nuclear, biological, and chemical NBC detection systems must be used to measure and validate acts of aggression involving WMD.
NBC detection systems should also be used to communicate a warning. Defensive measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or preventing an aggressor's movement toward the asset or by shielding the asset from weapons and explosives. These measures include barriers along with a response force.go to site
These measures provide barriers to movement and obscure lines of sight LOSs to assets. Defensive measures may be active or passive. Active defensive measures are manually or automatically activated in response to acts of aggression. Passive defensive measures do not depend on detection or a response. They include such measures as blast-resistant building components and fences. Guards may also be considered as a defensive measure. Most protective systems depend on response personnel to defeat an aggressor. Although defeat is not a design objective, defensive and detection systems must be designed to accommodate or at least not interfere with response-force activities.
Security threats are acts or conditions that may result in the compromise of sensitive information; loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction of property; or disruption of mission. Physical-security personnel and design teams must understand the threat to the assets they are to protect in order to develop effective security programs or design security systems.
Historical patterns and trends in aggressor activity indicate general categories of aggressors and the common tactics they use against military assets. Aggressor tactics and their associated tools, weapons, and explosives are the basis for the threat to assets. There are many potential sources of threat information. Threat assessment is normally a military-intelligence Ml responsibility. Ml personnel commonly focus on such security threats as terrorists and military forces. Coordinating with these elements on a regular basis is essential to maintaining an effective security program.
Security threats are classified as either human or natural. Human threats are carried out by a wide range of aggressors who may have one or more objectives toward assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations. Aggressors can be categorized and their objectives can be generalized as described below.
Four major objectives describe an aggressor's behavior. Any one of the first three objectives can be used to realize the fourth. Aggressor Categories Aggressors are grouped into five broad categories— criminals, vandals and activists, extremists, protest groups, and terrorists. Hostile acts performed by these aggressors range from crimes such as burglary to low- intensity conflict threats such as unconventional warfare.
Each of these categories describes predictable aggressors who pose threats to military assets and who share common objectives and tactics.